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Abstract
We introduce a class of differentiable, strictly increasing, concave utility func-
tions exhibiting an explicit demand of a good which may have Giffen behavior.
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition (bases on prices and consumers’
preferences and income) under which this good is normal, inferior or Giffen.
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1 Introduction
Inferior and Giffen goods have been mentioned in most microeconomics textbooks
(see Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Jehle and Reny (2011), Varian (2014) for instance).1
However, they are usually illustrated by pictures. In this paper, we present a class
of differentiable, strictly increasing, concave utility functions exhibiting an explicit
demand of a good which may have Giffen behavior. In our example, the consumption
set is R2+, and the demand function generated by our simple utility function has a
closed-form. Thanks to this tractability, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition
(based on prices and consumers’ preferences and income) under which this good is
normal, inferior or Giffen good. This helps us to analytically study income and prices
∗The authors are very grateful to an anonymous Associate Editor and two anonymous referees for
useful comments and suggestions. They have helped us to substantially improve our previous version.
†Email: Cuong.Le-Van@univ-paris1.fr. Address: CES-Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne – Maison
des Sciences Eco. 106-112 boulevard de l’Hoˆpital 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France.
‡Emails: ns.pham@montpellier-bs.com, pns.pham@gmail.com. Address: 2300 Avenue des
Moulins, 34080 Montpellier, France.
1Jensen and Miller (2008) provide real evidences (in two provinces of China: Hunan and Gansu)
of Giffen behavior.
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effects. In particular, we show that the Giffen behavior arises when the price is not so
high and the consumer’s income is at the middle level. This is supported by empirical
evidences in Jensen and Miller (2008): when the price of a staple good increases, the
poor people responds by decreasing their demand of this good while the group in the
middle increases demand.
The second part of our paper focuses on the general equilibrium effects. Our utility
function leads to an interesting point in general equilibrium context: the price of a
good may be an increasing function of the aggregate supply of this good. Moreover,
we show that the Giffen behavior may arise in equilibrium when preferences or/and
endowments of agents change.
In the existing literature, several examples of Giffen good have been proposed.
However, in most of the cases, utility functions are piecewise-defined or demand func-
tions are not explicit or the consumption set is restricted. Heijman and von Mouche
(2012) provide a collection of papers studying Giffen goods, including the paper of Doi,
Iwasa, and Shimomura (2009).
Here, we just mention two recent papers (Haagsma, 2012; Biederman, 2015). Haagsma
(2012) presents a separable utility function generating Giffen behavior.2 In this exam-
ple, the consumption set is restricted (precisely, it is (γ1,∞)× [0, γ2) with γ1 > 0, γ2 >
0) and the utility function is quasi-concave but not concave. Moreover, in Haagsma
(2012), the good 1 demand c1 is always decreasing in the income, denoted by w, what-
ever the prices and the consumer’s income. However, in our model, the sign of ∂c1
∂w
depends on prices and the consumer’s income. Recently, Biederman (2015) provides
a concave utility function3 and gives some numerical examples where Giffen behavior
arises. However, the demand function is not explicit. In our paper, we can explicitly
derive the demand function.
2 Individual demand
Assume that there are two goods and the consumption set is R2+. Given prices p1 > 0,
p2 > 0 and income w > 0, the consumer maximizes her utility U(c1, c2) subject to the
budget constraint p1c1 + p2c2 ≤ w. We will study how the demand c1 changes when
the consumer’s income w or/and price p1 change.
Assume that the solution is interior and the utility function is strictly increasing,
then we have p1c1 + p2c2 = w and
p2U1(c1, c2) = p1U2(c1, c2) (1)
where Ui(c1, c2) ≡ ∂U∂ci (c1, c2) for i = 1, 2. From this, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1. Assume that U is strictly increasing and in C2. Let (c1, c2) be an interior
solution and assume that p22U11(c1, c2)− 2p1p2U12(c1, c2)+p21U22(c1, c2) < 0.4 Then, we
2The utility function is u(c1, c2) = α1ln(c1−γ1)−α2ln(γ2− c2) where 0 < α1 < α2 and γ1, γ2 > 0,
with the domain c1 > γ1 and 0 ≤ c2 < γ2.
3Biederman (2015) considers the following utility function
u(c1, c2) =
{
(c1+αc2)
1−σ
1−σ −Ae−βc1 for σ > 0, σ 6= 1
ln(c1 + αc2)−Ae−βc1 for σ = 0
.
4This condition holds if the function U is strictly concave.
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have that:
∂c1
∂w
< 0 if and only if
p1
p2
U22(c1, c2)− U21(c1, c2) > 0 (2a)
∂c1
∂p1
> 0 if and only if
(p1
p2
U22(c1, c2)− U21(c1, c2)
)
c1 > U2(c1, c2). (2b)
Consequently, ∂c1
∂p1
> 0 implies ∂c1
∂w
< 0 (i.e., if good 1 is Giffen, then it must be inferior).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
We now introduce a class of utility function generating demand with Giffen behav-
ior. Suggesting by (2b), we choose a function so that U21/U22 is constant. Our utility
function is the following
U(c1, c2) = c1 + bc2 + A
(ac1 + c2)
1−λ
1− λ (3)
where a > 0, b > 0, λ > 0, A > 0, λ 6= 1.
Lemma 2. The function U defined by (3) is strictly increasing, differentiable, concave.
It is strictly quasi-concave if ab 6= 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
When ab = 1, we have ac1 + c2 = a(c1 + bc2). Hence U(c1, c2) = c1 + bc2 +
A (c1+bc2)
1−λa1−λ
1−λ
which is increasing in c1+bc2. By consequence, maximizing the function
U(c1, c2) is equivalent to maximizing the function c1 + bc2. In this case, the demand
for good 1 is given by
c1 =


0 if bp1 > p2
∈ [0, w
p1
] if bp1 = p2
w
p1
if bp1 < p2
(4)
and hence inferior and Giffen behaviors do not arise.
In the following, we will focus on the case ab 6= 1. If (c1, c2) is an interior solution
(0 < c1 < w/p1), the FOC gives
A(ap2 − p1) =
(
bp1 − p2
)((ap2 − p1)c1 + w
p2
)λ
(5)
Combining this condition with ab 6= 1, we get that ap2 − p1 6= 0 and bp1 − p2 6= 0. By
consequence, 0 < c1 < w/p1 implies that (bp1−p2)
(
w
p2
)λ
< A(ap2−p1) < (bp1−p2)
(
aw
p1
)λ
or equivalently
a+ 1
A
(
w
p2
)λ
1 + b 1
A
(
w
p2
)λp2 > p1 > a+
1
A
(
aw
p1
)λ
1 + b 1
A
(
aw
p1
)λp2 (6)
From this observation, we can compute the demand for good 1.
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Proposition 1. Consider the utility function given by (3) with ab 6= 1. The demand
function for good 1 is given by
c1 =


0 if
a+ 1
A
( w
p2
)λ
1+b 1
A
( w
p2
)λ
p2 ≤ p1
p2
(
A
ap2−p1
bp1−p2
) 1
λ
−w
ap2−p1
if
a+ 1
A
( w
p2
)λ
1+b 1
A
( w
p2
)λ
p2 > p1 >
a+ 1
A
(aw
p1
)λ
1+b 1
A
(aw
p1
)λ
p2
w
p1
if p1 ≤
a+ 1
A
(aw
p1
)λ
1+b 1
A
(aw
p1
)λ
p2
(7)
The demand function is continuous. Moreover, it is differentiable in (w, p1, p2, a, b, λ)
except points satisfying p1 =
a+ 1
A
( w
p2
)λ
1+b 1
A
( w
p2
)λ
p2 or p1 =
a+ 1
A
(aw
p1
)λ
1+b 1
A
(aw
p1
)λ
p2.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Notice that the demand function in (7) is computed for all possible parameters,
including prices and income. The consumer does not buy good 1 (resp., good 2) if
the price of good 1 (resp., good 2) is high in the sense that p1 ≥
a+ 1
A
( w
p2
)λ
1+b 1
A
( w
p2
)λ
p2 (resp.,
p2 >
1+b 1
A
(aw
p1
)λ
a+ 1
A
(aw
p1
)λ
p1). Under condition (6), the solution is interior. This happens when
prices and income have a middle level.
Proposition 1 allows us to identify conditions under which good 1 is normal, inferior
or Giffen.
Proposition 2. Let assumptions in Proposition 1 be satisfied. Consider the case of
interior solution (i.e., condition (6) holds).
1. Good 1 is normal (i.e., ∂c1/∂w > 0) if and only if ap2 < p1.
2. Good 1 is inferior (i.e., ∂c1/∂w < 0) if and only if ap2 > p1.
3. Good 1 has Giffen behavior (i.e., ∂c1/∂p1 > 0) if and only if
(bp1 − p2)
(w
p2
)λ
< A(ap2 − p1) < (bp1 − p2)
(aw
p1
)λ
(8a)
p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ
(
1− p2(ab− 1)
λ(bp1 − p2)
)
− w > 0. (8b)
Moreover, there exists a positive list (p1, p2, a, b, λ, A, w) such that (8a) and (8b)
hold.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
By combining Propositions 1 and 2, good 1 is normal if (1) the consumer only buys
this good (c1 = w/p1) or (2) the solution is interior (condition (8a) holds) and the
relative price is quite high (i.e., ap2 < p1). When the solution is interior, good 1 is
inferior if and only if the relative price p1/p2 is low (i.e., p1 < ap2).
We now look at conditions under which Giffen behavior arises. Condition (8a)
is to ensure that the optimal allocation is interior while condition (8b) means that
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∂c1/∂p1 > 0. Observe that conditions (8a) and (8b) are satisfied if bp1 > p2 > w > p1/a
and λ is high enough. In this case, we have Giffen effect. Point 3 of Proposition 2
suggests that Giffen behavior cannot arise if the income is high. When the income is
very low, Proposition 2 indicates that the solution is at the corner and so the good 1 is
normal. To sum up, Giffen behavior only arises when the income is at the middle level.
This property is supported by the empirical evidences in Jensen and Miller (2008).
We illustrate our result by some examples.
Example 1 (inferior good). Let prices be such that bp1 > p2, ap2 > p1 and income w
vary. According to (7), the demand for good 1 is
c1 =


w
p1
if w ∈ (0, w]
p2
(
A
ap2−p1
bp1−p2
) 1
λ
−w
ap2−p1
if w ∈ (w,w∗)
0 if w ∈ [w∗,∞)
where
{
w ≡ p1
a
(
Aap2−p1
bp1−p2
) 1
λ
w∗ ≡ p2
(
Aap2−p1
bp1−p2
) 1
λ
(9)
The good 1 is inferior iff the income has a middle level, i.e., w ∈ (w,w∗).
Example 2 (Giffen good). Take p2 = 2, a = 2, b = 3, A = 3, λ = 6, w = 1.1 and let p1
vary. In this case, we have ab > 1. Denote cint(p1) ≡
2
(
3
4−p1
3p1−2
) 1
6
−1.1
4−p1
. We can compute
the demand for good 1 as a function of p1 (see Appendix A.5 for detailed proof)
c1(p1) =


1.1
p1
if p1 ∈ (0, 2/3]
cint(p1) if p1 ∈ (2/3, 2.098)
1.1
p1
if p1 ∈ [2.098, 3.895]
cint(p1) if p1 ∈ (3.895, 3.91)
0 if p1 ∈ [3.91,∞)
(10)
We can verify that cint(p1) is decreasing on (2/3, 1.75] and increasing on [1.75, 2.098).
So, the demand is decreasing in p1 on (0, 1.75] or [2.098,∞) but increasing in p1 on
[1.75, 2.098). Hence, Giffen behavior arises when the price p1 runs from 1.75 to 2.098.
Remark 1 (Good 2). We have so far focused on good 1. We now look at good 2.
Observe that U(c1,c2)
b
= c2 +
1
b
c1 +
Aa1−λ
b
(c2+
1
a
c1)1−λ
1−λ
. Denote, a′ = 1/a, b′ = 1/b, A′ =
a1−λA/b, p′2 = p1, p
′
1 = p2. We see that the demand for good 2 corresponds to the
demand for good 1 of the consumer having the utility function c′1+ b
′c′2+A
′ (a
′c′1+c
′
2)
1−λ
1−λ
and facing budget constraint p′1c
′
1+p
′
2c
′
2 ≤ w. By consequence, good 2 may be normal,
inferior or Giffen.
We focus on the interior solution case (condition (6) holds). According to Propo-
sition 1, we have c2 =
p1
(
A
ap2−p1
bp1−p2
) 1
λ
−aw
p1−ap2
. In this case, good 2 is inferior if and only if
p1 > ap2 (in this case, good 1 is normal).
A natural issue is to study conditions under which good 2 is Giffen. First, we
observe that these two goods cannot be Giffen at the same time. Indeed, if good 1 is
Giffen, then Lemma 1 implies that it is inferior or equivalently ap2 > p1. If good 2
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is Giffen, applying Lemma 1, it must be inferior and hence p1 < ap2, a contradiction.
Second, we can prove that good 2 is Giffen if and only if
p1
a
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ
(
1− p1(ab− 1)
aλ(bp1 − p2)
)
− w > 0. (11)
Applying our above result, this happens if p2/b > p1 > w > ap2 and λ is high enough.
As for good 1, good 2 is Giffen only when the income has a middle level.
We end this section by providing some useful observations when finding utility
functions generating inferior goods as well as Giffen behavior.
1. Assume that the utility function is separable, i.e., U(c1, c2) = u(c1) + v(c2).
If both u and v are concave, then good 1 is normal. Indeed, we have U12 = 0.
So, Lemma 1 implies that: ∂c1
∂w
< 0 if and only if
p22
p21
u′′(c1)
v′′(c2)
+ 1 < 0. This cannot
happen because both u and v are concave. Therefore, good 1 is normal. So, if
we want to have inferior or Giffen goods, u or v must not be concave.5
2. We can obtain Giffen behavior with simple utility functions by restricting the
consumption set in another way. Indeed, assume that U(c1, c2) = c1 + bc2 with
b > 0 and the consumption set is {(c1, c2) ∈ R2+ : c1 + c2 ≥ 1}. c1 + c2 ≥ 1
is interpreted as survival condition. We can verify that: if p1 < p2 < bp1 and
w < p2, then c1 =
p2−w
p2−p1
which is increasing in price p1 and decreasing in income
w.
3. In the case of Leontief utility U(c1, c2) = min(u(c1), v(c2)) where u, v are in-
creasing, c1 is increasing in w. However, Sorensen (2007) considers the function
U(c1, c2) = min(u(c1, c2), v(c1, c2)) and show that this function may generate
Giffen behavior.
3 Equilibrium
We now look at equilibrium properties. We consider a pure exchange economy with
two goods. Assume that there are m agents with the same utility function U(c1, c2) =
c1 + bc2 + A
(ac1+c2)1−λ
1−λ
, where a > 0, b > 0, λ > 0, λ 6= 1. The consumption set is R2+
and the endowments of agent i are wi1 > 0, w
i
2 > 0 for goods 1, 2, respectively.
We firstly investigate the equilibrium prices. The income of agent i is wi ≡ p1wi1 +
p2w
i
2. We focus on interior equilibrium: c
j
1 ∈ (0, wi/p1) ∀i. According to Proposition
5We may have examples with inferior good or Giffen behavior if u or v is not concave. Indeed,
we firstly present an example generating inferior good. Assume that the consumption set is R2+
and U(c1, c2) = Aln(c1) +
c2
2
2 . In this case, the demand for good 1 is c1 =
w
p1
if w2 ≤ 4Ap22 and
c1 =
w−
√
w2−4Ap2
2
2p1
if w2 > 4Ap22. So, the good 1 is normal if w
2 ≤ 4Ap22 and inferior if w2 > 4Ap22.
Second, Haagsma (2012) considers a separable function u(c1, c2) = α1ln(c1−γ1)−α2ln(γ2−c2) where
the second term is convex in c2. In this case, he shows that good 1 may be Giffen. Note that the
consumption set is (γ1,∞)× [0, γ2) which is restricted.
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1, we have that
(ap2 − p1)ci1 = p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − wi. (12)
From this and the market clearing condition
∑
i c
i
j =
∑
iw
i
j ∀j = 1, 2, we can
compute the relative price p¯1 ≡ p1/p2.
Proposition 3. Assume that ab 6= 1. Denote p∗ ≡ a+
(aw1+w2)
λ
A
1+b
(aw1+w2)
λ
A
and wj ≡
∑m
i=1w
i
j/m
for j = 1, 2.
If (aw1 + w2)min(1,
p∗
a
) < p∗wi1 + w
i
2 < (aw1 + w2)max(1,
p∗
a
), then there exists an
interior equilibrium with the relative price
p1
p2
= p∗. Moreover,
∂(p1/p2)
∂b
< 0 <
∂(p1/p2)
∂a
(13)
1. If ab > 1, then p1/p2 ∈ (1/b, a) and is decreasing in w1, w2 but increasing in A.
2. If ab < 1, then p1/p2 ∈ (a, 1/b) and is increasing in w1, w2 but decreasing in A.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
According to Proposition, our utility function (3) generates a property: the price
of good 1 (resp., good 2) is increasing in its aggregate supply W1 ≡
∑
iw
i
1 (resp.,
W2 ≡
∑
iw
i
2) if ab < 1 (resp., ab > 1). This point may illustrate ideas presented in
Section 17.E ”Anything goes: the theorem Sonnenschein-Martel-Debreu” in Mas-Colell
et al. (1995).
We now look at the demand for good 1 of agent i to understand when Giffen
behavior arises. According to (12) and (13), we can compute
ci1(p¯1) =
aw1 + w2 − wi2 − p¯1wi1
a− p¯1 . (14)
By consequence, we have the following result.
Corollary 1. We have
∂ci1
∂p¯1
=
aw1 − awi1 + w2 − wi2
(a− p¯1)2 . (15)
This result leads to an implication: the Giffen behavior arises when preferences of
agents change. Indeed, without the loss of generality, assume that ab > 1. We also
assume that agent i’s endowments are low in the sense that aw1+w2 > aw
i
1+w
i
2. In this
case, when A increases or b decreases, the relative price p¯1 increases. By consequence,
the demand for good 1 of this agent increases in the relative price p1/p2.
Notice that the Giffen behavior can also arise when agents’ endowments change.
Indeed, let us consider a simple case where there are identical agents and ab < 1. In
this case, ci1 = w1 ∀i and the relative price p1/p2 is increasing in w1. So, the good 1
consumption ci1 = w1 is increasing in p1/p2. In this case, the good 2 consumption is
decreasing in p2/p1.
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Remark 2. Nachbar (1998) introduces another definition of Giffen good in a general
equilibrium context. According to Nachbar (1998), the good 1 is Giffen in our exchange
economy if the (endogenous income) aggregate demand C1 for good 1 is increasing in
its price p1. We can compute the aggregate demand and the aggregate excess demand
Z1(p)
C1(p) ≡
∑
i
ci1(p, p1w
i
1 + p2w
i
2) =
∑
i
p2
(
Aap2−p1
bp1−p2
) 1
λ − (p1wi1 + p2wi2)
ap2 − p1
=
m
ap2 − p1
(
p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − (p1w1 + p2w2)
)
Z1(p) ≡
∑
i
(
ci1(p, p1w
i
1 + p2w
i
2)− wi1
)
=
m
ap2 − p1
(
p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − p2(aw1 + w2)
)
.
We can check that ∂C1(p)
∂p1
= ∂Z1(p)
∂p1
. Moreover, we compute
∂C1(p)
∂p1
=
mp2
(ap2 − p1)2
[(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ
(
1− p2(ab− 1)
λ(bp1 − p2)
)
− (aw1 + w2)
]
. (16)
At equilibrium (i.e., p1/p2 = p
∗), we have
(
Aap2−p1
bp1−p2
) 1
λ = aw1+w2. We also see that
ab−1
bp1−p2
> 0.6 By consequence, ∂C1(p)
∂p1
< 0. So, the good 1 is not Giffen in the sense of
Nachbar (1998). This result is in line with that in Remark 3 in Nachbar (1998).
To sum up, with our utility function (3), good 1 may be Giffen in the standard
sense but it is not Giffen in the sense of Nachbar (1998).
Remark 3 (price taˆtonnement). Without loss of generality, we can normalize by set-
ting p2 = 1. The dynamic price equation (17.H.1) in Mas-Colell et al. (1995) is in our
case of one-dimension ∂p1(t)
∂t
= c1Z1(p1(t)). According to Remark 2, we have
∂Z1(p1)
∂p1
< 0
at equilibrium. So, our equilibrium price is locally stable.7
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
By taking the derivatives of both sides of the equation (1) with respect to w and noting that
c2 =
w−p1c1
p2
, we have
(
p2U11(c1, c2)− p1U12(c1, c2)
)∂c1
∂w
+ U12(c1, c2)
=
(
p1U21(c1, c2)− p
2
1
p2
U22(c1, c2)
)∂c1
∂w
+
p1
p2
U22(c1, c2)
6If ab > 1, we have p∗ > 1/b. Thus, bp1 > p2 and therefore
ab−1
bp1−p2
> 0. If ab < 1, we have
p∗ < 1/b. Thus, bp1 < p2 and therefore
ab−1
bp1−p2
> 0.
7Following Mas-Colell et al. (1995) (page 621), an equilibrium price (p1, p2) is locally stable if,
whenever the initial price vector is sufficiently close to it, the dynamic trajectory causes relative
prices to converge to the equilibrium relative price p1/p2.
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from which we get that(
p22U11(c1, c2)− 2p1p2U12(c1, c2) + p21U22(c1, c2)
)∂c1
∂w
= p1U22(c1, c2)− p2U12(c1, c2).
Condition p22U11(c1, c2)− 2p1p2U12(c1, c2) + p21U22(c1, c2) < 0 implies (2a).
By taking the derivatives of both sides of (1) with respect to p1, we get(
p2U11
(
c1,
w−p1c1
p2
)
− p1U12
(
c1,
w−p1c1
p2
))
∂c1
∂p1
− c1U12(c1, w−p1c1p2 )
= U2(c1,
w−p1c1
p2
) + p1
(
U21(c1,
w−p1c1
p2
)− p1
p2
U22(c1,
w−p1c1
p2
)
)
∂c1
∂p1
− c1 p1p2U22(c1,
w−p1c1
p2
)
Consequently, we obtain
∂c1
∂p1
(
p2U11(c1, c2)− 2p1U12(c1, c2) + p
2
1
p2
U22(c1, c2)
)
= U2(c1, c2) + c1U12(c1, c2)− c1 p1p2U22(c1, c2).
which implies (2b).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
It is easy to see that the function U is strictly increasing and differentiable. It is concave
because both functions c1 + bc2 and A
(ac1+c2)1−λ
1−λ are concave. It is strictly quasi-concave
because
∣∣∣∣ 0 U1U1 U11
∣∣∣∣ = −(U1)2 < 0 and
∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 U1 U2
U1 U11 U12
U2 U12 U22
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = λA(ac1 + c2)−λ−1(1− ab)2 > 0 (A.1)
where Ui(x1, x2) ≡ ∂U∂xi and Uij ≡ ∂∂xj
(
∂U
∂xi
)
.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The budget constraint must be binding: p1c1 + p2c2 = w. Since the feasible set is convex,
concave and the function U is strictly quasi-concave and strictly increasing, there exists a
unique solution. We write FOCs
U1(c1, c2) + κ1 = p1µ, κ1 ≥ 0, κ1c1 = 0 (A.2a)
U2(c1, c2) + κ2 = p2µ, κ2 ≥ 0, κ2c2 = 0. (A.2b)
We have U1(c1, c2) = 1 + aA(ac1 + c2)
−λ and U2(c1, c2) = b + A(ac1 + c2)
−λ. We consider
different cases.
1. c1 = 0, c2 = w/p2. In this case, κ2 = 0 and then
U2(c1,c2)
p2
= µ ≥ U1(c1,c2)
p1
. This means
that
p2
(
1 + aA(ac1 + c2)
−λ
)
≤ p1(b+A(ac1 + c2)−λ)⇔ (w
p2
)−λ(ap2 − p1)A ≤ bp1 − p2
⇔ A(ap2 − p1) ≤
(
bp1 − p2
)(w
p2
)λ
⇔
a+ 1
A
( w
p2
)λ
1 + b 1
A
( w
p2
)λ
p2 ≤ p1.
It is easy to verify that: this condition holds if and only if (c1, c2) = (0, w/p2).
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2. c1 = w/p1, c2 = 0. In this case, κ1 = 0 and then
U2(c1,c2)
p2
≤ µ = U1(c1,c2)
p1
. This means
that
p2
(
1 + aA(ac1 + c2)
−λ
)
≥ p1(b+A(ac1 + c2)−λ)⇔ (aw
p1
)−λ(ap2 − p1)A ≥ bp1 − p2
⇔ A(ap2 − p1) ≥
(
bp1 − p2
)(aw
p1
)λ
⇔ p1 ≤
a+ 1
A
(aw
p1
)λ
1 + b 1
A
(aw
p1
)λ
p2
It is easy to verify that: this condition holds if and only if (c1, c2) = (w/p1, 0).
3. Let us consider an interior solution 0 < c1 < w/p1. We will prove that this is the case
if and only if condition (8a) hold, i.e.,
(bp1 − p2)
(w
p2
)λ
< A(ap2 − p1) < (bp1 − p2)
(aw
p1
)λ
. (A.3)
The FOC becomes U1
p1
= U2
p2
, or equivalent
p2
(
1 + aA(ac1 + c2)
−λ
)
= p1(b+A(ac1 + c2)
−λ)
⇔ A(ap2 − p1) =
(
bp1 − p2
)((ap2 − p1)c1 + w
p2
)λ
(A.4)
Since ab 6= 1, condition (A.4) implies that ap2 − p1 6= 0 and bp1 − p2 6= 0. So, the
equation (A.4) has a unique solution (because λ > 0).
(a) Case 1: ap2 − p1 > 0 which implies that bp1 − p2 > 0. The above equation has a
unique solution c1 in (0, w/p1) if and only if (A.3) holds.
(b) Case 2: ap2 − p1 < 0 which implies that bp1 − p2 < 0. The right hand side is
an increasing function of c1. So, the equation (A.4) has a unique solution c1 in
(0, w/p1) if and only if (A.3) holds.
Summing up, the equation (A.4) has a unique solution c1 in (0, w/p1) if and only if
(A.3) holds. In such case, ap2 − p1 6= 0 and bp1 − p2 6= 0 and we find that(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ
=
(ap2 − p1)c1 + w
p2
⇔ (ap2 − p1)c1 = p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − w. (A.5)
Continuity. We now prove the continuity of the demand function. Observe that the
utility function is continuous and the budget correspondence
B(p1, p2) ≡ {(c1, c2) ∈ R2+ : p1c1 + p2c2 ≤ w}
is continuous. From the maximum theorem, the demand correspondence is upper semi con-
tinuous. Since we have proven above that it is single valued, it is in fact a continuous function.
We can also prove the continuity of the demand function by using the following properties
lim
A(ap2−p1)−(bp1−p2)(
w
p2
)λ→0
p2
(
Aap2−p1
bp1−p2
) 1
λ − w
ap2 − p1 = 0,
lim
A(ap2−p1)−(bp1−p2)(
aw
p1
)λ→0
p2
(
Aap2−p1
bp1−p2
) 1
λ − w
ap2 − p1 =
w
p1
.
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Differentiability. If A(ap2 − p1) 6= (bp1 − p2)
(
w
p2
)λ
and A(ap2 − p1) 6= (bp1 − p2)
(
aw
p1
)λ
,
then the demand determined by (7) is differentiable. Indeed, there are only three cases:
If A(ap2 − p1) < (bp1 − p2)
(
w
p2
)λ
, then c1 = 0 which is differentiable.
If A(ap2 − p1) > (bp1 − p2)
(
aw
p1
)λ
, then c1 = w/p1 which is differentiable.
If (bp1 − p2)
(
w
p2
)λ
< A(ap2 − p1) < (bp1 − p2)
(
aw
p1
)λ
, then we have ap1 − p1 6= 0 and
bp1 − p2 6= 0. Then c1 =
p2
(
A
ap2−p1
bp1−p2
) 1
λ
−w
ap2−p1
is well defined and differentiable.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Points 1 and 2 are obvious. We now look at the Giffen behavior. We have
c1 =
1
ap2 − p1
(
p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − w
)
∂c1
∂p1
=
1
(ap2 − p1)2
(
p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − w
)
+
A
1
λ p2
ap2 − p1
1
λ
(ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ
−1 p2(1− ab)
(bp1 − p2)2 .
Therefore, we get that
(ap2 − p1)2 ∂c1
∂p1
= p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ
+
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ 1
λ
p22(1− ab)
bp1 − p2 − w (A.6)
which implies point 3. We now prove that there exists a positive list (p1, p2, a, b, λ, w,A) such
that (8b) and (8a) hold, i.e., ∂c1
∂p1
> 0. Indeed, let ap2−p1 > 0, bp1−p2 > 0 and p2 > w > p1a .
These conditions imply that 0 < p2−w
ap2−p1
< w
p1
. When λ→∞, we have
1
ap2 − p1
(
p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − w
)
−→ p2 − w
ap2 − p1 ∈
(
0,
w
p1
)
(A.7)
p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ
+
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ 1
λ
p22(1− ab)
bp1 − p2 − w −→ p2 − w > 0. (A.8)
A.5 Proof of Example 2
With our parameters, we have
a+ 1
A
( w
p2
)λ
1+b 1
A
( w
p2
)λ
p2 = 3.91.
1. According to Propositions 1, c1 = 0 if p1 ≥ 3.91.
2. If p1 ≤ 2/3, then bp1 < p2 and ap2 > p1. According to Proposition 1, we have
c1 = w/p1 = 1.1/p1.
3. We now focus on the case 2/3 < p1 < 3.91. In this case, we have bp1 > p2 and
ap2 = 4 > p1. Notice that
p1 >
a+ 1
A
(aw
p1
)λ
1 + b 1
A
(aw
p1
)λ
p2 ⇔ A(ap2 − p1) < (bp1 − p2)
(aw
p1
)λ
.
Since p1 ∈ (2/3, 3.91), this happens if and only if p1 < 2.098 or p1 > 3.895. According
to Proposition 1, we have c1 = c
int(p1) if p1 ∈ (2/3, 2.098) or p1 ∈ (3.895, 3.91).
When p1 ∈ [2.098, 3.895], we have p1 ≤
a+ 1
A
(aw
p1
)λ
1+b 1
A
(aw
p1
)λ
p2. In this case, Proposition 1 implies
that c1 = w/p1 = 1.1/p1. We have just proved (10).
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We now look at the case where p1 ∈ (2/3, 2.098). According to Proposition 2, good 1 is
Giffen (i.e., ∂c1/∂p1 > 0) if and only if p2
(
Aap2−p1
bp1−p2
) 1
λ
(
1− p2(ab−1)
λ(bp1−p2)
)
−w > 0. This happens
if and only if p1 > 1.75.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
We have proved that if equilibrium is interior, the relative price must be
p1
p2
= p∗ ≡ a+
(aw1+w2)λ
A
1 + b (aw1+w2)
λ
A
. (A.9)
Note that p∗ ∈ (min(a, 1/b),max(a, 1/b)). We have to now prove that with this price, the
allocation (ci, ci2) given by
(ap2 − p1)ci1 = p2
(
A
ap2 − p1
bp1 − p2
) 1
λ − wi, p1ci1 + p2ci2 = p1wi1 + p2wi2 (A.10)
is optimal for the agent i. To do so, it suffices to check the following condition (we apply
Proposition 1),
(
bp1 − p2
)(wi
p2
)λ
< A(ap2 − p1) <
(
bp1 − p2
)(awi
p1
)λ
. (A.11)
We prove this condition for the case ab > 1. The case ab < 1 is similar. Suppose ab > 1.
Consider the function f(x) = a+x1+bx . We have f
′(x) = 1−ab
(1+bx)2
< 0. Condition a > 1/b implies
that p1
p2
=
a+
(aw1+w2)
λ
A
1+b
(aw1+w2)
λ
A
∈ (1
b
, a). Since ab > 1, condition (A.11) is equivalent to


bp1 − p2 > 0, ap2 − p1 > 0(
wi
p2
)λ
< Aap2−p1
bp1−p2
<
(
awi
p1
)λ ⇔
{
bp1 − p2 > 0, ap2 − p1 > 0
p1w
i
1+p2w
i
2
p2
< aw1 + w2 <
a(p1wi1+p2w
i
2)
p1
(A.12)
⇔
{
1
b
< p1
p2
< a
p1
p2
wi1 + w
i
2 < aw1 + w2 < a(w
i
1 +
p2
p1
wi2)
(A.13)
This condition holds because ap2 > p1 and we assume that
(aw1 + w2)min(1,
p1
ap2
) <
p1
p2
wi1 + w
i
2 < (aw1 + w2)max(1,
p1
ap2
) (A.14)
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